Factors influencing farmers’ willingness to participate in water allocation trading. A case study in southern Spain by Giannoccaro, Giacomo et al.
Spain was the first European country to set up a 
water-rights market. Irrigators, who are the main water 
users in Spain, can buy and sell only their yearly water 
allocations (temporary) within the stipulations of the 
Water Law and subject to the approval of the Water 
Authority if a transaction involves an inter-basin trans-
fer.1 However, since the adoption of the Water Law, the 
number of actual transactions has been limited and only 
during times of drought has market trading reached any 
level of importance (Hernández & De Stefano, 2013; 
Rey et al., 2014).
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Abstract
This study aims to uncover the factors that influence farmers’ attitudes towards water allocation trading. In the study, we simu-
late two water availability scenarios, an average year and a drought year, in a contingent valuation experiment with 241 farmers. A 
survey was held in the spring of 2012 in the Guadalquivir and Almanzora River Basins. First, we estimated a multinomial logit 
model to determine the factors that influence farmers to decide to participate in our hypothetical market. We then analysed the 
structural and socio-economic factors determining the monetary value of traded water using Heckman’s two-step model. Our results 
indicate that those farmers who are more innovative and have had agricultural training show a higher willingness to participate in 
water trading. Additionally, low water-supply guarantee and appropriate information about seasonal water availability increase the 
probability of participation. Higher willingness to pay (WTP) for water is found in horticulture and among farmers who grow citrus 
and other permanent crops; lower water selling value (WTA) is found in farms with extensive annual crops and traditional olive 
groves. However, monetary values (WTP/WTA) are strongly dependent on the current cost of irrigation water services. While find-
ings of this research seem to support the idea of diffusion innovation theory, the existence of ethical concerns that might influence 
farmers’ acceptance of irrigation water markets needs further analysis.
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Introduction
Water trading is increasingly seen as an appropriate 
method to flexibly allocate scarce water rights and to help 
achieve economically efficient water use. Using markets 
can be especially useful in areas that face frequent periods 
of drought and water shortages. The strategic document 
on water management by the European Commission (EC, 
2012) proposes the use of water markets as one of the 
instruments to be employed in agriculture to achieve the 
goals of the Water Framework Directive (WFD).
1  Formal water markets were first introduced in Spain in 1999. Temporary trading of water rights is permitted while permanent 
transfer of water rights is not allowed. Notwithstanding, there have been some exceptions. Palomo et al. (2015) reported a detailed 
description of the law evolution since 1999. 
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This study will focus on temporary allocation trading 
in southern Spain where significant market transactions 
between the Guadalquivir River Basin and the Alman-
zora Basin took place in 2006 and 2007. While the 
traded volume in those transactions was considerable 
(2% of total water allocations), only a small number of 
agents were involved.3
The early stages of market development are usually 
characterized by unfamiliarity, the existence of trade 
barriers and slow market activity, resulting in a limited 
number of transactions among a small number of op-
erators (Nicol & Klein, 2006; Wheeler et al., 2010). 
The resulting lack of competitiveness can lead to biased 
market prices and traded volume (Giannoccaro et al., 
2015). 
Based on the actual transactions within the Goul-
burn–Murray Irrigation District, Wheeler et al. (2009) 
analysed the early years of water trading in Australia. 
Here we aim to provide a wider overview of farmer 
attitudes towards water trading in the two basins. For 
this, we carry out a contingent valuation (CV) experi-
ment and analyse how structural, socio-economic and 
climatic factors (i.e., drought) would influence farmers’ 
participation in irrigation water markets as well as their 
willingness to pay (WTP) for water allocations and 
their willingness to accept (WTA) selling them. 
The first results of this CV experiment are reported 
in Giannoccaro et al. (2015), who reconstructed the 
market supply and demand for irrigation water. While 
they focused on the quantitative impacts of allocation 
trading in southern Spain, here we will analyse the fac-
tors influencing farmers’ willingness to participate. 
Our approach to market acceptance is based on the 
hypothesis that irrigation water trading might be seen 
as an innovation enabling a new form of water manage-
ment as input of farming activity. As a consequence, 
as a seller the farmer’s adoption will occur if the ex-
pected utility from trade outweighs the utility from 
continuing to irrigate or continuing to water. As a 
buyer, the farmer’s adoption is driven by the major 
utility expected by purchasing water on the market. 
This also implies that the farmer’s utility function may 
diverge depending on the farmer and according to water 
productivity (i.e., crops), socio-economic factors and 
farm-related features. The diffusion of innovation 
theory (Rogers, 2003) is the main reference for this 
approach. 
The CV methodology has been used in Spain to 
estimate the WTP for irrigation water, as in Calatrava 
Judging by the experience of countries with similar 
climatic conditions, such as Australia and Chile (Bjorn-
lund, 2003; Wheeler et al., 2010), the Spanish water 
market could be expected to grow in importance. On 
the other hand, in the United States (California, Colo-
rado and Texas) market mechanisms have been in place 
longer and trading remains limited (Grafton et al., 
2010). Alberta (Canada) is another example where 
water markets, established in the last decade, have only 
generated limited trading activity (Nicol & Klein, 2006; 
Bjornlund et al., 2014). 
Most of the existing research on the topic in Spain 
has been based on mathematical models and simulation 
(e.g., Arriaza et al., 2002). Although there is a lack of 
empirical evidence, the little evidence that is available 
shows that water markets do not achieve the perfor-
mance that the theoretical and simulation work antici-
pates. To attain the full potential of water markets, 
deeper knowledge is required of the factors that influ-
ence farmers’ acceptance of the mechanism. 
For instance, Cook & Rabotyagov (2014) analysed 
irrigators’ preferences for water market lease attributes 
in the Yakima River basin in Washington state and 
found that farmers as sellers take account of non-pe-
cuniary elements in the relative comparison of their 
profit from farming and their profit from agreeing to a 
deal. Wheeler et al. (2009) demonstrated that the water 
market development in Australia follows an innovation 
adoption model in agriculture. As a consequence, there 
would be some other social factors (e.g., farmer’s age, 
his/her education) along with the basic economic con-
venience that influences farmers’ participation. 
Ortiz & Ceña (2001) analysed farmers’ perception 
of water rights in the Guadalquivir at the time of the 
first water reform in 1999. While the law established 
the water right license (i.e., concession), farmers still 
perceived it as a property right. It is likely that beyond 
that, the water right license has been attached to the 
land (Palomo et al., 2015). Giannoccaro et al. (2013) 
highlighted the importance and diversity of stakehold-
ers’ attitudes towards water markets in the Guadalquivir 
Basin, which range from radical opposition, for either 
ethical or strategic reasons, to their acceptance, al-
though under restricted conditions. These authors find 
that all stakeholders (i.e., managers, water right holders 
and non-holders) are highly reluctant to permanently 
sell their water rights while managers and water rights 
holders would accept temporary allocation trading 
mechanisms.2 
2 Here it is interesting to mention the Goulburn-Murray Basin in Australia, which is probably the most dynamic irrigation water 
market worldwide. Bjornlund (2003), Bjornlund & Rossini (2005) and Wheeler et al. (2010) all analyse its market development and 
show that the majority of transactions has occurred through temporary allocation trading.
3 These inter-basin transactions are described in detail in Berbel et al. (2014).
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up almost half of the irrigated area, and are cultivated 
in both a traditional, extensive system and an intensive 
farming system. Irrigation has always been part of the 
intensive system, but application of deficit irrigation 
has now become more common in the traditional sys-
tem as well, which has led to a large increase in irriga-
tion over the last decade (Berbel et al., 2012). The 
average applied irrigation in the basin is 3324 m3/ha. 
Berbel et al. (2013) described the basin’s trajectory 
towards basin closure, illustrating that available re-
sources are already fully or over-committed. The cur-
rent hydrological plan for the basin proposes a pro-
gramme of measures to tackle the water imbalances 
(Berbel et al., 2012).
The Almanzora River is located in the Almería Prov-
ince. Administratively, it is part of the Mediterranean 
River District, which consists of a number of small and 
very small reservoirs. Groundwater in the district is 
exploited on a large scale and salt intrusion is common 
along the coastline. The Almanzora Basin is the east-
ern-most basin in the district and is characterised by 
high value, mainly citrus, vegetable and greenhouse 
crop production within the Bajo-Almanzora while olive 
tree in the Alto-Almanzora. On average, 4925 m3/ha of 
irrigation water is applied, which in 2008 amounted to 
an overall demand of almost 267 Mm3. 
An inter-basin transfer system connects the Gua-
dalquivir River to the Almanzora Basin, through which 
the Government transports 50 Mm3/year from the for-
mer to the latter in the absence of drought conditions 
in the Guadalquivir Basin. The transfer system makes 
inter-basin trading a possibility, but actual trading, at 
both intra and inter-basin level, is still uncommon. The 
few markets operations that have taken place consisted 
of large volume inter-basin transfers, from field crop 
irrigators in the Guadalquivir Valley to greenhouse 
vegetable producers in Almería. In 2006 and 2007, both 
drought years, 8.5 Mm3 and 35.5 Mm3 were traded, 
respectively; the price was 0.18 EUR/m3.
Hardly any trading operations over the last years 
have been carried out because of extraordinary rainfall 
patterns. Indeed the 2009 and 2011 have been the 
rainiest years over the last 50, and never occurred in 
2009 the catchment storage limit was reached.
Survey description
In the spring of 2012, a survey was administrated 
among 241 farmers in the Guadalquivir and Alman-
zora River Basins (79% from the Guadalquivir Basin 
and 21% from the Almanzora Basin). A comparison of 
the sample and the overall population is given in 
Table 1. In the Guadalquivir, farmers were sampled 
& Sayadi (2005) on the Granada coast, or Colino & 
Martinez (2002) in southeastern Spain. Research on 
the WTA monetary reward for selling irrigation water, 
as in Garrido et al.’s (1996) study of the Guadalquivir 
River Basin, is scarcer. The main conclusion from these 
studies is that farmers much prefer buying water on the 
market than they do selling it. CV studies have also 
been applied in the context of irrigation water to 
evaluate farmers’ WTP for water supply guarantees 
(Mesa-Jurado et al., 2012) or the use of wastewater 
(Alfarra et al., 2013).
This study seeks to identify the profile of irrigators 
in the Guadalquivir and Almanzora River Basins who 
are likely to use water markets to cope with water 
shortages. First, a multinomial logit model (MNL) is 
estimated to determine the factors that influence farm-
ers’ willingness to buy and sell water in principle. 
Second, the monetary value of traded water is analysed 
using Heckman’s two-step model.
Material and methods
Study area
The analysis is carried out for the Guadalquivir and 
the Almanzora River Basins. The first has more irri-
gated area than any other basin in Spain, and the sec-
ond, with its concentration of greenhouses and high 
value crops, is home to the most profitable irrigation 
agriculture in the country. Together they represent 
roughly 25% of Spain’s irrigated area. Both basins are 
located in southern Spain and have a Mediterranean 
climate and a heterogeneous precipitation distribution. 
The variability in water availability and recurrent 
droughts, lead to periods in which water scarcity 
reaches critical levels. 
The Guadalquivir River is the longest in southern 
Spain with a length of around 650 km. Its basin covers 
an area of 57,527 km2 and has a population of over 4.2 
million people. The annual average temperature in the 
Guadalquivir River Basin is 16.8ºC and it has an aver-
age precipitation of 630 mm/year. The most common 
types of land cover/use in the basin are forests (49%) 
and agriculture (47%), with the remainder covered by 
urban areas (2%) and wetlands (2%). Overall available 
water resources stand at 3362 Mm3/year, while net 
demand in 2008 rose to 3578 Mm3/year, 2981 Mm3 of 
which was for irrigation. The irrigated area in the Gua-
dalquivir Basin comprises 845,000 ha, including olive 
groves, fruit orchards (mainly citrus and peaches) and 
general field crops, such as cotton, maize, sunflowers 
and sugar beet. A small proportion is also dedicated to 
rice farming near the river estuary. Olive groves make 
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from the Seville, Cordoba and Jaen provinces. In the 
Almanzora Basin, farmers were surveyed in 10 mu-
nicipalities out of 27. Of these latter respondents, 80% 
were from Bajo-Almanzora. To study the variation of 
the perception of water markets across the two basins, 
the sampling procedure included several features such 
as location, irrigated farm size, crop pattern, as well as 
irrigation water availability. Moreover, interviews were 
carried out with water rights holders and non-holders. 
The questionnaire included 35 structured questions 
over four parts: i) socio-demographic information; ii) 
farm characteristics; iii) irrigation issues; and iv) con-
tingent valuation questions. 
We collected the main farm-related data such as 
structural (e.g., farm size, irrigated land) and crop 
systems features as well as data concerning the farmer 
– namely, farmer’s age, educational level, agricultural 
income and whether he or she was/had an on-farm fam-
ily employee (see Table S1 [online resource]). Moreo-
ver, according to the aim of this research, a number of 
questions on the irrigation market were asked.
In the CV part of the questionnaire, farmers were first 
asked whether they would be willing to buy or sell water 
in principle.4 Those respondents disagreeing were asked 
to give the main reason. Four closed options plus an 
open answer were given as follows: a) fear that the gov-
ernment will reduce my allocation in the future if I sell 
it; b) lack of enough information about or knowledge of 
the booking procedure; c) mistrustful information about 
the water-trading mechanism; d) water should not be a 
tradable good; and e) specify other reason. These options 
were set based on the literature review.
When a farmer declared he or she was in favour of 
water trading, separate auctions were simulated for 
buying and selling. A first closed bid was made at 0.18 
EUR/m3 and depending on the farmer’s response, the 
price was increased or decreased by 33% (0.24 or 0.12 
EUR/m3 bids, respectively). After this, the farmer was 
asked the maximum (minimum) water price (s)he 
would be willing to pay (accept). 
The hypothetical auctions were carried out under 
two water availability scenarios: i) a normal year and 
ii) a drought year, with allocations in the latter re-
stricted to half their usual level. Two fixed tradable 
volumes were proposed to all farmers: 500 and 1,000 
m3/ha/year. Both volumes and the starting price in the 
auctions were in line with real figures from the 2006 
and 2007 operations. This is also in agreement with the 
results of Cook & Rabotyagov (2014) who found that 
sellers are more likely to accept split-season than full-
season leases. Generally, resource scarcity might affect 
the willingness to engage in a market as a seller (Oses 
& Viladrich, 2007). Finally, an open section was given 
for those who left other comments.
Table 1. Representativeness of the sample.
Variables
Guadalquivir Almería
Study area‡ Sample (191 Obs.) Study area Sample (50 Obs.)
Irrigated land (ha) 842,055 6,629 54,290 1,079
Water rights
holder 81% 80.1% 95% 100%
non-holder 19% 19.9% 5% 0%
Water allocation (normal year) 3,950 m3/ha 4,170 m3/ha n.a. n.a.
Water use (normal year) 3,324 m3/ha 2,524 m3/ha 4,925 m3/ha 3,963 m3/ha
Farm size (mean) 16.5 ha 41.16 ha 14.2 ha 19.24 ha
Irrigated land area (mean) 9.3 ha 26.40 ha 9.2 ha 17.38 ha
Irrigated crops‡
Winter cereals 76,400 ha (9%) 697 ha (10.5%) Citrus 7,370 ha (12%) 298 ha (27.6%)
General field crops† 144,546 ha (17.4%) 1,409 ha (21.3%) Olive 19,318 ha (30%) 44 ha (4.1%)
Olive 466,677 ha (55.4%) 3,307 ha (49.9%) Vegetable 6,834 ha (10%) 92 ha (8.5%)
Citrus and fruit 58,521 ha (7%) 393 ha (5.9%) Greenhouses 29,000 ha (45%) 591 ha (54.8%)
Others 95,908 ha (11.2%) 824 ha (12.4%) Others 1,827 (ha) (3%) 54 ha (5%)
Source: Giannoccaro et al. (2015). † General field crops: maize, sugar beet, sunflower, vegetables. ‡ In parenthesis, percentage of ir-
rigated area.
4 As one of the reviewers has noticed, the majority of farmers in Spain are not holders of rights themselves but members of water 
users associations (WUA) that are the effective holders of the water concessions. Most farmers cannot directly trade water but only 
through the WUA they belong to. Their individual opinion cannot be taken as an approximation of the real potential for water trading, 
as such an opinion would be filtered through a voting process in the WUA that they belong to. Palomo et al. (2015) also pointed out 
this kind of barrier. 
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est utility for the decision maker. For instance here, a 
decision maker is a farmer, labeled i, that faces a choice 
among J alternatives. 
Mutually exclusive alternatives for the different at-
titudes that farmers can have to water markets are: not 
willing to participate in a water market; only willing 
to buy; only willing to sell;willing to both buy and sell.
The decision maker obtains a certain level of utility 
from each alternative. It is assumed that the farmer 
chooses the alternative that provides the greatest utility. 
For the i-th farmer faced with J choices, suppose 
that utility of choice j is:
 Uij =Vij + εij  ∀ J [1]
where Uij refers to the utility of farmer i-th obtained 
from choice alternative j; Vij is an observable portion 
of the utility function and εij captures the unobserved 
influences on a respondent’s choice. The observed (Vij) 
part of utility is specified to be linear in parameters 
with a constant:
 Vij = x 'ij β + K j  ∀ J [2]
where x'ij is a vector of variables that relate to alterna-
tive j as faced by decision maker i-th, β are coefficients 
of these variables, and Kj is a constant that is specific 
to alternative j. 
On the other hand, εij ∀ j is not known and therefore 
these terms are treated as random. Assumption on the 
distribution form of εij makes the differences of discrete 
choice models. Logistic is by far the most widely used 
discrete choice model. It is derived under the assump-
tion that εij is extreme value for all i. The critical part 
of assumption is that the unobserved factors are uncor-
related over alternatives, as well as having the same 
variance for all alternatives. For more details see Train 
(2003). 
The multinomial (logit) model is the most frequent-
ly used model for nominal outcomes which cannot be 
ordered. In the case of multinomial regression, the 
effects of independent variables are allowed to differ 
for each outcome. In estimating the model a reference 
alternative j=0 with β0 =0 is set while the probability 
that a farmer chooses alternative j=1,2,3 is given by:
 Pr(Yi = j) =
eβ jχi
1+ eβ jχi
1
3
∑
; j=1,2,3  [3]
The multinomial logit model determines which 
variables explain a farmer’s likelihood to be in each of 
the aforementioned alternatives (j=1,2,3) against to the 
reference alternative j=0. The alternative ‘not willing 
to participate in a water market’ (No participation) was 
As a whole, 199 out of 241 farmers (82.6%) had 
access to water resources. Of them, 195 apply irriga-
tion. In particular, 176 respondents are members of 
WUA, 67 hold a private well and 25 rely on other 
sources. The average water use per hectare in the Gua-
dalquivir Basin amounts to 2,524 m3/ha and 4,000 m3/
ha in the Almanzora Basin. Although these values are 
below the average water use in a normal year, the fig-
ure shows the differences between the two basins. By 
contrast, on average, farms in the sample are larger 
than those in the study area as a whole, especially 
within the Guadalquivir Basin. 
Despite the survey’s small size, the sample repre-
sentativeness is satisfactory considering the large 
variability exhibited within and between the study 
areas. A comprehensive description of the survey can 
be found in Giannoccaro et al. (2015).
Methodology
The survey data are analysed in two phases: in the 
first phase, using a multinomial logit model, we deter-
mine the variables that influenced a farmer’s decision 
to participate in the hypothetical water market, while 
in the second phase, the determinants of the WTP/WTA 
monetary values are estimated using Heckman’s two-
step model.
As we show later, we used the MNL model to esti-
mate farmers’ decisions about water market participa-
tion and thereby analysed four independent alternatives, 
each of which has a different motivation, instead of the 
simple dichotomic choice (i.e., whether or not to enter 
the water market), as in Heckman’s first step. Indeed, 
the first step in Heckman’s model intends to resolve 
the possible problem of sample bias rather than esti-
mate the determinants of farmers’ participation in water 
trading. 
Participation decision
In the first phase of the CV analysis we determined 
farmers’ attitudes towards water trading. Farmers are 
firstly positioned in a hypothetical situation of temporal 
necessity and then asked whether they would be willing 
to buy water. Subsequently, for the same farmers a hy-
pothetical situation of having a surplus is created when 
they are asked whether they would be willing to sell. 
These questions are posed under two scenarios of water 
availability a normal year and a drought year with al-
locations in the latter reduced by 50%. 
The economic theory underlying stated preferences 
assumes that the most preferred option yields the high-
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used as the base option. The estimated coefficients of 
the independent variables indicate the probability of 
belonging to the class ‘only willing to buy’ or ‘only 
willing to sell’ or ‘willing to buy and sell’, compared 
to farmers unwilling to participate in a water market. 
Initially, as predicted by the diffusion innovation 
theory (Rogers, 2003) variables that most conformed 
to the technology inspired diffusion hypothesis in-
cluded: farm’s age, education, agricultural training, 
farmer’s innovativeness, farm size (total and irrigated). 
As a consequence, younger, higher educated, with a 
farming training, and mostly innovative farmers with 
larger irrigated farmland will be more likely to enter 
the water market to trade. As further consideration, the 
awareness of previous trading operation increases the 
likelihood of participation (Bjornlund, 2006; Giannoc-
caro et al., 2013). Once the decision of adoption is 
taken, a farmer can act as seller, buyer or both, depend-
ing on the seasonal water availability and consumption. 
In this case, at least two variables might be related to 
irrigator’s decision, namely the advance knowledge 
about water availability and the water supply reliabil-
ity. These pieces of information can help farmers to 
make rational decisions whether sell or buy water al-
location on the market. Finally, we expect that farms 
with extensive herbaceous crops will be more likely to 
sell being more flexible in their crop pattern and water 
consumption while farms with vegetables or intensive 
olive threes, will be mostly the buyers. 
The definition and descriptive statistics of the inde-
pendent variables can be found in Table S1 [online 
resource].
Determinants of WTP and WTA values 
Several of the observed variables are censored, the 
most relevant of which are the monetary values for 
WTP/WTA; they are only available for those who 
would participate in water trading. Obviously, for non-
participating farmers there are no data. Consequently, 
a simple linear OLS model cannot be used to estimate 
a function of WTP/WTA, because the self-selection of 
the sample based on the willingness to trade violates 
the random selection process assumed in this model.
Heckman (1979) proposed a two-step procedure to 
account for self-selection processes within a sample. 
First, the probability of participating in the water mar-
ket (yes or no) is estimated through a probit model, 
which is a function of Xi independent variables and is 
named the ‘selection equation’. The residuals of the 
selection equation are used to construct a selection bias 
control factor, which is called lambda (λ) and is equiv-
alent to the inverse Mills’ ratio. For each observation 
this factor summarizes the effects of all unmeasured 
characteristics that are related to market participation. 
In the second step, the principal (or substantial) 
equation –in our case the WTP/WTA monetary values– 
is estimated by OLS, in which the selection bias cor-
rection factor (λ) is included as an additional independ-
ent variable. Formally:
 Step1:
   
λ i = φ Xi '
 
β( )
Φ Xi '
 
β( )  [4]
 Step2 :WTAi / Pi =Wi 'α + aλ
 
λ i + ui  [5]
If λ is significant, there is selection bias, and its 
coefficient corrects the influence that the explanatory 
variables have on WTP and WTA: upwards (negative 
coefficient) or downwards (positive coefficient). In this 
study an adaptation of the Heckman model is used in 
which the selection equation is estimated by logit 
rather than probit regression as proposed by Lee (1983), 
and the principal model is estimated by weighted least 
squares to avoid bias caused by heteroscedasticity. The 
statistical package SPSS (version 17) is used to esti-
mate the Heckman model following the method de-
scribed by Smits (2003).
Results
Participation decision 
Of the 241 administered questionnaires, 172 pro-
vided valid observations in the valuation section of the 
questionnaire, 129 from the Guadalquivir Basin and 43 
from the Almanzora Basin. The following cases were 
excluded from the analysis: farms without irrigation or 
current water rights (as only those farms that hold 
rights are allowed to trade under the current legisla-
tion); farmers who intended to exit the sector; and 
farmers who did not answer the valuation questions.
Farmers’ attitudes towards water trading differed 
substantially between the basins (Table 2). Almost all 
irrigators in the Almanzora Basin were willing to trade, 
both buying and selling water allocations under both 
rainfall scenarios. Diversely, in the Guadalquivir Basin, 
the majority was unwilling to trade in either scenario 
(59% in a normal year and 52% under drought condi-
tions). For those who were willing to participate, most 
wanted to sell in a normal year and buy when there is 
a drought.
Table 3 reports the results of the MNL models. The 
predictive ability of the estimated models is good (see 
-2LL ratio and pseudo R2) while 79% of the observa-
tions are classified correctly in all models (classifica-
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are focused on. In Table 3, the models for the options 
Only-Buy in the normal rainfall scenario and Only-Sell 
in the drought scenario are not shown, as the number 
of observations for these options was too small. All 
independent variables that were significant or helped 
improve the fit of the models are included.
First, in the normal scenario, farmers are more 
likely to participate as buyer and seller if they (i) have 
had farm training; (ii) undertook farm improvements 
in the last five years (innovation)5; and (iii) have ad-
vance knowledge about water availability. Meanwhile, 
farmers are less likely to participate in water trading if 
they (iv) have a higher level of education; (v) grow 
extensive herbaceous crops (winter cereals, maize, 
oilseed); or tend (vi) traditional olive groves. Addition-
tion plots are reported in Table S2 [online resource]). 
The variance inflation factor (VIF) to check for multi-
collinearity is 2, below the tolerance limit. Table 3 
reports the coefficients β and the significance of each 
variable influencing the farmer’s decision to participate 
in the market. The sing of coefficient can be inter-
preted as a major or minor probability for a farmer 
being in one of the different classes of participation 
(i.e. Buy and Sell, Only-Buy or Only-Sell) against the 
No-participation decision. The intensity of effect, 
known as the marginal effect, refers to the impact on 
the likelihood of a change in one variable while all 
other variables are set at the mean. In this research, due 
to the small size of the sample, the marginal effects are 
neglected and the qualitative aspects of model results 
Table 2. Participation frequency (number of observations).
Guadalquivir Basin Almanzora Basin
Normal year Drought year Normal year Drought year
No participation 76 67 2 2
Only-Buy 4 37 1 1
Only-Sell 39 4 0 0
Buy-and-Sell 10 21 40 40
Total 129 129 43 43
Source: Own elaboration of survey data.
5 The innovation variable refers to both changes on the farm and farming practices as well as investments implemented over the 
past 5 years. We used it as a proxy of farmer’s innovativeness. A list of options is reported in the Table S2 [online resource].
Table 3. Farmers’ participation in a seasonal water market.
Variables
Normal yeara Drought yearb
Buy-and-Sell Only-Sell Buy-and-Sell Only-Buy
Constant –10.824 9.477* –6.423 –4.536
Irrigation area (ha) 0.029 0.003 0.047 0.023
Water consumption (m3/ha) 0.147 –0.172** 0.044 0.024
Farmer’s age –0.004 –0.066* –0.003 0.005
Educational level –1.849* –0.666 –1.670* 0.134
Farm training 3.465** 0.123 2.988*** 0.772
Aware of water trading 1.293 1.081 1.058 1.342*
Innovation 3.393* 1.767* 3.710*** –0.144
Rain fed crops 1.247 0.341 0.440 –2.131*
Advance knowledge about water availability 22.002*** 3.220*** 3.961* 0.172
Guarantee water supply –3.092* 0.987 –1.789 –0.684
Multiple water sources –0.637 –0.094 0.916 1.223
Extensive herbaceous crops –5.007* 1.583* –4.693** 1.045
Vegetable crops –0.779 –1.455 –1.329 –0.429
Traditional olive crop –5.768*** –0.384 –4.062*** 0.802
Intensive olive crop –1.061 0.135 –0.923 –0.908
Other permanent crops (citrus, fruit, vineyard) –1.883 1.193* –2.726* –3.051**
– 2 Log Likelihood: 138.018
R2 MacFadden: 0.626
–2 Log Likelihood: 164.946
R2 MacFadden: 0.525
a The class Only-Buy had very few observations, therefore was excluded; b The class Only-Sell had very few observations, therefore 
was excluded; *** significant at 0.01 level; **significant at 0.05 level; * significant at 0.1 level.
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ally, (vii) guaranteed water supply decreases the likeli-
hood of participating.
Second, again in a normal year, farmers are more 
likely to want to Only-Sell if they (i) undertook farm 
improvements in the last five years; (ii) have advance 
knowledge of water availability; (iii) grow extensive 
herbaceous crops; or grow (iv) other permanent crops. 
On the other hand, lower probability is related to (v) 
higher average water consumption per hectare and (vi) 
farmer’s aging. In practice, the higher the on-farm water 
consumption, the lower is the probability that farmers 
will sell water. This is the same for the farmer’s age. 
Turning to the drought scenario (Table 3), all the 
previous variables are confirmed for those who would 
operate in the market as seller and buyer except for 
guaranteed water supply; other permanent crops (citrus, 
fruit, vineyard) reduce the probability of farmers being 
both sellers and buyers. In other words, moving from 
normal to a drought year, the farmer’s profile of par-
ticipation in the market does not change. 
On the contrary, the profile of farmers that Only-Buy 
in drought years is quite different to the previous one. 
Indeed, the only statistically significant variable that 
increases the likelihood of participation refers to the 
awareness of previous water trading, while having rain-
fed crops or other permanent crops reduces the prob-
ability. 
It should be mentioned that some variables were not 
found to have statistically significant coefficients in 
any of the model specifications, namely: (i) the size of 
the irrigation area; (ii) having access to multiple water 
supply sources; (iii) growing vegetable crops; and (iv) 
having intensive olive groves. Variables that were 
tested but were neither significant nor added to the fit 
of the models are: (i) being a part-time farm; (ii) using 
hired employees; (iii) having full-time family workers; 
(iv) having knowledge of the Water Law; and (v) the 
legal status of the farm.
On the other hand, it should be stressed that among 
the variables expected to be significant under the diffu-
sion innovation theory, educational level demonstrated 
the opposite (namely, the higher the level, the less likely 
it is for the farmer to be in the adopting class); this is the 
same in the normal and drought scenarios. This is a sur-
prising result and opposed to results obtained in other 
studies such as Wheeler et al.’s (2009) where the educa-
tional level increases the likelihood of participation in 
the ex-post water market in both buying and selling water. 
The results allow us to classify farmers according 
to their stated attitudes towards water trading:
•   The participative farmer, who is willing to both 
buy and sell. The likelihood of being in this class 
is higher among farmers with farm training who 
make frequent innovations and who have advance 
information about their water allocation. 
•   The non-participative farmer, with the opposite 
attitude, who neither wants to buy nor sell. Farm-
ers in this class innovate less, and their assigned 
water allocations are nearly always guaranteed. 
Moreover, the farmer’s age is also significant, with 
older farmers being less likely to enter the market. 
This type of farmer is more likely to grow exten-
sive arable crops and have traditional olive groves. 
•   Between these extremes, two types of participants 
can be distinguished: 
a)  Those who will only sell in a normal year. 
While variables such as innovation and ad-
vance knowledge of water allocation are also 
significant, farmers who only sell in a normal 
year can be distinguished by lower on-farm 
water consumption, a younger age and tending 
of arable crops or other permanent crops. One 
possible explanation for the negative sign of 
water consumption in the model explaining 
willing to sell could be that those farmers with 
larger consumption per hectare are the ones 
performing intensive agriculture. 
b)  Those who will only buy in drought years. 
These farmers have irrigated crops that are 
different from other permanent crops such as 
citrus or vineyard. Within this group, being 
aware of previous water market transactions 
increases the likelihood of market participa-
tion. 
Willingness to pay for and to accept selling 
water 
In this section, farmers’ WTP and WTA values for 
buying and selling water allocations are analysed by 
estimating the two-step Heckman model. In the regres-
sion model (second step) only positive WTP and WTA 
values are analysed. This prevents getting inconsistent 
results from the model when there are too many zero 
bidders. In the survey the number of legitimate zero 
responses varies between WTP and WTA, between 
tradable volumes (500 and 1,000 m3/ha), as well as 
between the water availability scenarios6. No protest 
bidders were identified among the zero values. 
6 The number of answers with zero value are in a normal year, 4 and 2 in the case of WTP, 4 and 3 in the case of WTA, for 500 
and 1,000 m3/ha respectively; while in drought condition, 20 and 11 in the case of WTP, 1 and 2 in the case of WTA, for 500 and 
1,000 m3/ha, respectively. 
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all combined models, most likely acting as a refer-
ence for farmers’ bids. It is the only variable in 
the combined models with a significant effect on 
WTP in a normal year. Water costs are higher in 
the Almanzora Basin than in the Guadalquivir 
Basin, and are therefore an important driver of the 
differences in WTP and WTA values between the 
basins. In the Almanzora model water costs re-
mains an important explanatory variable, having 
the only significant coefficient across all scenar-
ios. In the Guadalquivir Basin it only has a sig-
nificant explanatory effect on WTP under drought 
conditions (500 m3/ha).
•   Water consumption per hectare also has a positive 
significant coefficient in the combined model and 
is higher in the Almanzora Basin than in the Gua-
dalquivir Basin.
•   Regarding the crop variables, a higher proportion 
of on-farm vegetables and permanent crops (e.g. 
citrus) leads to higher WTP values in the drought 
scenario. Vegetables and permanent crops are not 
significant in the basin-specific models. A higher 
proportion of olive groves, either traditional or 
intensive, reduces WTA values in the drought 
scenario. The proportion of intensive olive groves 
keeps its negative effect on WTA values under 
drought conditions in the Almanzora Basin, but 
has the opposite effect in the Guadalquivir Basin 
in normal years, increasing the WTA values. The 
proportion of extensive herbaceous crops is only 
significant in the Guadalquivir model, lowering 
the WTP prices for 500 m3/ha under drought con-
ditions. 
•   The presence of rain fed crops has an opposite effect 
in the two basins. In the Guadalquivir Basin (and in 
the combined model) it increases WTP in the 
drought scenario (1000 m3/ha), while lowering WTA 
values in a normal year (500 m3/ha). In the Alman-
zora Basin, on the other hand, WTP values in the 
drought scenario are lower if a farm has rain fed 
crops (and there is no significant effect on WTA).
Table 4 reports the number of observations and the 
mean WTP and WTA values. WTP and WTA were 
higher in the drought scenario than in a normal year; 
values were higher in the Almanzora than in the Gua-
dalquivir Basin; WTA values were slightly higher than 
WTP values in the Almanzora Basin, and virtually the 
same in the Guadalquivir Basin; volume had only a 
small effect on the WTP and WTA values. 
While valuation studies of pure public goods mean 
WTA was usually considerably higher than mean WTP, 
here the differences were small, which is consistent 
with the type of good being valued, i.e. water as a pro-
ductive input in agriculture (Horowitz & McConnell, 
2002). 
Table 5 reports the modelling results for farms from 
both catchments combined, including both the selection 
function and the main model. The fit of the models is 
good (adjusted R2> 0.8 in all scenarios). The number 
of observations in the model is lower than those in 
Table 4 because of missing data for several variables. 
Initially a location variable in the pooled regression 
to justify basin specific behaviour was included with 
the result of hindering many of explicative variables. 
As a consequence regression models were also esti-
mated for each basin separately. However, for the 
Guadalquivir Basin only models with a sufficient num-
ber of observations were estimated, these were the 
cases of drought scenario for WTP values and a normal 
year for WTA values. Moreover, in the Almanzora 
Basin almost all farmers participated in both scenarios, 
which means there cannot be sample selection bias and 
there is no need for the first step of the Heckman pro-
cedure. A simple OLS regression is fitted for this basin. 
Tables 6 and 7 report these results. The goodness of fit 
of these models is lower, especially of the Guadalquivir 
Basin model.
The results of the three models are summarized 
below:
•   Farmers’ current water costs have a significant and 
strong positive effect on both WTP and WTA in 
Table 4. Number of observations and mean WTP and WTA (€/m3/ha) ‡.
Scenarios Volume (m3/ha) Obs.
Combined  
sample
Guadalquivir  
Basin
Almanzora  
Basin
Normal year WTP 500 52 0.35 0.15 0.39
1000 53 0.34 0.16 0.39
WTA 500 79 0.28 0.15 0.41
1000 80 0.28 0.15 0.40
Drought year WTP 500 78 0.37 0.17 0.54
1000 86 0.36 0.16 0.54
WTA 500 61 0.42 0.17 0.55
1000 60 0.42 0.17 0.55
‡ zero values excluded.
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Table 6. Heckman model: Guadalquivir Basin farms.
SELECTION MODEL: LOGIT MODEL
Willing to buy water allocation Willing to sell water allocation
Drought year Normal year
500 m3/ha 1000 m3/ha 500 m3/ha 1000 m3/ha
Intersection -2.060*** -2.206*** -2.711*** -2.415***
Irrigation area (ha) 0.046***
Farm training 1.900***
Aware of water trading 1.692*** 2.092*** 1.106*
Innovation 1.264**
Rain fed crops -2.188**
Advance knowledge about water availability 1.849*** 1.905***
Intensive olive crop 1.028*
Others permanent crops -3.072** -2.408***
-2 Log Likelihood
Correct classification rate
Number of observations
110.854
81.1%
136
109.764
79.5%
136
130.622
72.1%
135
136.974
73.6%
134
PRINCIPAL MODEL: REGRESSION
Maximum WTP (€/m3) Minimum WTA (€/m3)
Intersection 0.249*** 0.214*** 0.115*** 0.184***
Water costs (€/m3) 0.188*
Farm training 0.037**
Rain fed crops 0.082** -0.048***
Share of agricultural income
Hired employees -0.122* -0.064*
Extensive herbaceous crops farmland -0.00005*
Intensive olive crop farmland 0.0004* 0.0003*
Lambda (inverse Mill ratio) 0.046** 0.038*
Adjusted R2 0.240 0.267 0.311 0.319
Number of observations 36 44 40 40
*** significant at 0.01 level; **significant at 0.05 level; * significant at 0.1 level.
Table 7. OLS Regression: Almanzora Basin farms.
Maximum WTP (€/m3) Minimum WTA (€/m3)
Normal year[a] Drought year[a]
Normal year
Drought year[a]
500 m3/ha 1000 m3/ha
Intersection -0.005 0.355*** 0.064 0.038 0.376***
Water costs (€/m3) 0.973*** 0.503*** 0.820*** 0.879*** 0.412**
Farm training -0.044* -0.048*
Rain fed crops -0.132**
Reservoir on farm 0.058* 0.066***
Full-time family worker 0.040*
Intensive olive crop farmland -0.001**
Adjusted R2 0.702 0.554 0.512 0.620 0.552
Number of observations 40 40 38 38 39
[a] The same findings for 500 and 1000 m3/ha. *** significant at 0.01 level; **significant at 0.05 level; * significant at 0.1 level.
•   Having a reservoir on the farm for private use 
increases both WTP and WTA values during peri-
ods of drought. The coefficient is significant in 
the combined and Almanzora models, but not in 
the Guadalquivir model. 
•   Several socioeconomic variables also have an ef-
fect on WTP and WTA. In the Almanzora Basin, 
farm training reduces WTP and WTA values under 
drought conditions, and the presence of at least 
one full-time family worker increases WTA, also 
Giacomo Giannoccaro, Manuela Castillo and Julio Berbel
Spanish Journal of Agricultural Research March 2016 • Volume 14 • Issue 1 • e0101
12
under drought conditions. Instead, in the Gua-
dalquivir Basin farm training increases the WTA 
values in a normal year. Also in this last Basin the 
presence of hired employees reduces WTP values 
in the drought scenario.
•   In the combined model the prices depend on the 
type of market participation so that farmers par-
ticipating as buyers and sellers (variable “buyer 
and seller”) would pay (WTP) and would accept 
(WTA) higher prices than those participating only 
as buyers or sellers, respectively. The variable 
“buyer and seller” is significant for WTP in the 
drought scenarios and for WTA in normal condi-
tions, the scenarios with the highest participation. 
However, it is not significant in the Guadalquivir 
and Almanzora individual models. 
•   The bias factor lambda is significant in the drought 
scenarios of the combined model for WTA. With-
out the negative lambda coefficient, the effect of 
the independent variables on WTA would have 
been underestimated. In the Guadalquivir model 
lambda is significant and positive for WTA in a 
normal year meaning it prevents an overestimate 
of the effects of the independent variables on 
WTA.
Discussion
As a whole, the findings show a good acceptance of 
irrigation water markets among farmers, with 28% 
against any type of water trading. The findings of re-
gression models of farmers’ stated preferences suggest 
that the decision-making process proceeds in two steps. 
The entrance to the market occurs first and the price-
related preference is processed after. In fact, determi-
nants of a farmer’s decision in our models are different 
between the two decision-making processes. 
The factors that influence farmers’ willingness to 
participate in the water market in our study are gener-
ally in line with the diffusion innovation theory as well 
as other authors’ results. First, the fact that more inno-
vation-oriented farmers are more likely to accept water 
markets can be seen in the results of Colino & Mar-
tínez (2002) and Calatrava & Sayadi (2005). The for-
mer also find a positive effect of specialized farm 
training, while in the latter study, low supply security 
makes farmers more eager to trade. Wheeler et al. 
(2009) claimed that irrigators perceive water markets 
as another management tool and, that its adoption by 
Australian irrigators fits the theory of innovations. 
While they found a positive relationship between edu-
cational level and market acceptance, the farmer’s age 
was not significant which is contrary to the diffusion 
of innovations theory. Moreover, Bjornlund (2006) 
found that Australian farmers’ prior knowledge of 
market operations encourages their participation. 
As a whole, our results partly support these findings, 
as those irrigators most willing to enter the market are 
more innovative, have an agricultural training or are 
younger. Likewise, awareness of past water-trading 
operations and advance knowledge of actual water 
availability increase the farmer’s participation. On the 
other hand, relevant variables such as farmland size 
(total and irrigated) did not show significance, while 
educational level had an opposite influence. In this 
regard, it is worth mentioning that the main reason for 
farmers to refuse market participation is the view that 
water is not a commercial good (for more details on 
this issue see Giannoccaro et al., 2013). 
In the second stage of the decision-making process, 
WTP and WTA values were strongly influenced by ir-
rigators’ current water costs and the crops the farmers 
grew: values were higher for high value crops with a 
low water-deficit resistance such as vegetables and 
citrus, and lower among olive growers, who cultivate 
a water-deficit tolerant crop. Also the most active par-
ticipants in the market (i.e. buyer and seller) would pay 
or accepts higher prices for water. Although the number 
of variables across all models seems to influence the 
farmer’s WTP for buy or accept selling water, when 
one takes into account the estimated coefficients of 
each variable, only the current cost of the irrigation 
water services has a noteworthy impact.
Concluding remarks
Water markets give power to farmers and water users 
rather than to technicians and governments in deciding 
how to make the best use of the resource. It has been 
demonstrated in Australia, Spain and California that 
water trading has increased agricultural production and 
helped farmers and communities survive severe 
droughts.
This study has investigated which factors influence 
farmers’ acceptance of water trading and the results 
can be of help if policy makers decide to further im-
plement water trading within their irrigation water 
management. In Europe, irrigation water markets have 
been operating solely in Spain, while recently the 
European Commission through the Water Blue Print 
document (EC, 2012) has recognized the market 
among other instruments useful for the WFD’s goals 
achievement. 
Although water markets have received special atten-
tion by economists, the extent of its adoption is, in 
many cases, supported by little evidence. The optimis-
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tic perspective of irrigation water markets resulting 
from mathematical modelling contrasts with the diffu-
sion pattern of water trading. While findings of this 
research seem to support the idea of diffusion innova-
tion theory, with a large acceptance among farmers, the 
passage of time is necessary for innovations to be 
adopted; they are rarely adopted instantaneously. This 
work just shows the main profile of likely early adop-
ters of the water market as a tool of farm management; 
the relative diffusion pattern falls out of scope. On the 
other hand, even with high learning curve, potential 
adopters might not adopt the innovation anyway. In-
novations can have symbolic value (e.g. ethical) that 
discourages adoption. In this respect, identity aspects 
(e.g. to be a farmer and farm) and social concerns might 
play a relevant role. The existence of ethical concerns 
that might influence farmers’ attitudes towards irriga-
tion water markets needs further analysis. 
The CV methods can improve the analysis taking 
into account some no-economic attributes of farmer’s 
decision, but as known the outputs should be taken with 
caution, due to the context-related influence.
Finally, our results indicate a positive relationship 
between the willingness to participate in the market 
and the level of information about the annually avail-
able water, suggesting that uncertainty hinders decision 
making about the purchase or sale of water, thereby 
potentially leading to lower market participation. Con-
sidering these results, it could be beneficial to bring 
forward the yearly decision whether or not to bring the 
drought protocol into force (the quota allocation 
mechanism in case of shortages). This would increase 
farmers’ ability to adapt to droughts, for example buy-
ing or selling water, and thereby improve water alloca-
tion efficiency, which in turn may reduce the eco-
nomic losses caused by droughts.
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